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I. PRE-PRODUCTION—INTRODUCTION
The magic phrase “now known or later developed” is the caveat and bedrock
of the Copyright Act 1 , and is found in its first two provisions. 2 These words are
intended to ensure that new technology is a part of the Copyright Act. 3 Despite
these five magic words, we have let technology get away from us, and the law is
impeding our improvement. 4
The Copyright Act was last amended in 1999 to comport with the advent of
new technologies. 5 However, the 1999 amendments may be catering to the
entertainment industry and its lobbyists. 6 Individual consumers cannot afford to
lobby, and these individual consumers create our social norms. Our social norm
is non-compliance with the infringement provisions of the Copyright Act, and in
particular, illegal downloading.
Historically, copyright has been protected for the benefit of the public. 7
Currently the predominant view in the courts places the author or rights holders’
interests above society’s interests. 8 The issue is whether this view violates the
historical policy behind the Copyright Act.

1

The definitions section of the Copyright Act states,
‘Copies’ are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work
is fixed by any method now known or later developed . . . . A ‘device’,
‘machine’, or ‘process’ is one now known or later developed . . . .
‘Phonorecords are material objects in which sounds, other than those
accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by
any method now known or later developed . . . .
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). The next reference to the phrase is in the provision on copyrightable
subject matter, “A copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of
authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed . . . .” Id.
§ 102(a).
2
Id. §§ 101, 102(a).
3
General Revision of Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat 2541, (amending title 17 of
the United States Code in its entirety), enacted October 19, 1976; see ALFRED C. YEN & JOSEPH P.
LIU, COPYRIGHT LAW: ESSENTIAL CASES AND MATERIALS 5 (Thompson West 2008).
4
See YEN & LIU, supra note 3, at 9.
5
28 U.S.C. § 4001 (2006); see generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201-1205, 1301-1332 (2006).
6
See YEN & LIU, supra note 3, at 12.
7
One economic philosophy behind the Copyright Act is to encourage individual effort by
rewarding authors for their creation, thus incentive is produced for the good of society.
Historically, it is in the public’s best interest to distribute works as widely as possible. See Mazer
v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); Nash v. CBS Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1542 (7th Cir. 1990).
8
See New York Times v. Tasini, 184 F. Supp. 2d 350, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (interpreted the
Copyright Act so that authors should unquestionably gain all protection unless it is clearly stated
in the Copyright Act that they should not).
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The invention of new technology has consistently had an effect on the law of
copyrights. 9 The advent of the Internet and its effect on copyright has been
argued in case law on many issues, from the posting of poetry to the streaming of
pirated videos. The focus of this article is the dilemma of peer-to-peer file
sharing websites and the availability of a cause of action for infringement of
copyrighted sound recordings.
The war to hinder the damage done to the recording industry has taken many
paths. 10 Beginning with the attack on websites and Internet service providers
(“ISPs”) themselves, precedent has been set in the secondary infringement area of
law. 11
A new battle is being waged, not against the corporations which have reaped
financial benefits by enticing its user-base with free music downloads, 12 but
against the individual non-commercial users. 13 These users are being held liable
for millions of dollars in statutory copyright damages. 14 This leads to the
9

See YEN & LIU, supra note 3, at 12. Congress has amended the Copyright Act more than
twenty times since 1976. Id. This has been in reaction to specific problems that arise as
technology advances. See, e.g., Burrow Giles Lithography Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58–60
(1884); see also, Williams Elecs. v. Artic Int’l, 685 F.2d 870, 873–74 (3d Cir. 1982).
10
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios became
precedent on the issue of contributory infringement in the peer-to-peer file sharing cases. 464 U.S.
417 (1986). In Sony, the invention of Sony’s video cassette recorder did not subject Sony to
secondary copyright liability because it was capable of substantial non-infringing uses. 464 U.S.
at 456. Other cases involving the issue of secondary liability for copyright infringement were
filed, and rules regarding peer-to-peer file sharing networks and copyright infringement were
forged. E.g., A & M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004, 1023–24 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that
Napster did receive financial benefit from the infringement, had the right and ability to supervise
the infringing activity, and therefore A&M Records had demonstrated a likelihood of success on
the merits on the claim of vicarious infringement); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster,
545 U.S. 913, 939–40 (2005) (Grokster found liable because it induced its users to infringe).
Damages in these cases have been difficult to assess. These consequences of secondary copyright
infringement by peer-to-peer file sharing have been varied and include a drop in CD prices to the
extinction of many independent music stores. Ethan Smith, Sales of Music, Long in Decline,
Plunge Sharply: Rise in Downloading Fails to Boost Industry; A Retailing Shakeout, WALL ST. J.,
MAR. 21, 2007, at A1. The MPAA (Motion Picture Association of America) reported in 2005 that
American studios lost $2.3 billion due to Internet piracy. Press Release, Motion Picture
Association of America, Swedish Authorities Sink Pirate Bay, Huge Worldwide Supplier of
Illegal Movies Told No Safe Harbors for Facilitators of Piracy! (May 31, 2006) (on file with
author), available at http://www.mpaa.org/press_releases/2006_05_31.pdf.
11
See infra Part III.
12
See generally Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 913 (2005). In
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, copyright holders sued a peer-to-peer file sharing company for
copyright infringement. Id.
13
See Capital Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1212–13 (D. Minn. 2008).
14
See infra Part IV.
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question of this digital age: whether the amount of an award against a noncommercial user of a peer-to-peer network for infringement can be so excessive
that it is in violation of the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution. 15
II. SOUND SOURCE SELECTION—THE LAW
A. Statutory Damages Under the Copyright Act
The owner of a copyright is entitled to certain rights with respect to certain
artistic works. 16 The rights holder has the right to exclude any other person from
reproducing the work, preparing derivative works, distributing the work,
performing the work, displaying the work or using the work covered by copyright
for a specific period of time. 17 When another violates one of these rights, he has
infringed the copyrighted work and is liable to the copyright holder for a certain
amount in damages; either actual or statutory.
To prevail in a copyright infringement action under the Copyright Act, a
plaintiff must show (1) ownership of a valid copyright, 18 and (2) unauthorized
copying or distribution of the copyrighted work. 19 If copyright infringement is
found, the copyright owner may elect, instead of actual damages, statutory
damages, in a sum ranging from a minimum of $750 to a maximum of $30,000
for any one work. 20 There is no need to prove actual damages before electing an
award of statutory damages. 21
If the copyright owner proves the infringement was willful, the court may
increase the award per work up to and including a maximum of $150,000. 22 If the
15

See Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1227:
[T]he damages awarded in this case are wholly disproportionate to the
damages suffered by Plaintiffs. Thomas allegedly infringed on the
copyrights of 24 songs-the equivalent of approximately three CDs,
costing less than $54, and yet the total damages awarded is $222,00more than five hundred times the cost of buying 24 separate CDs and
more than four thousand times the cost of three CDs.
16
17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 106 (2006).
17
Id. § 102(a).
18
Id. § 412.
19
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (“To establish
infringement two elements must be proven: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of
constituent elements of the work that are original.”); 17 U.S.C. § 501.
20
17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1).
21
F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, 344 U.S. 228, 229 (1952). As long as the
damages award is within the limitations proscribed by the statute, “the court’s discretion and sense
of justice are controlling.” Id. at 232.
22
17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).
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infringer proves that he was unaware he was infringing, the court may reduce the
award to a minimum of $200 for any one work. 23 If the infringer had reasonable
grounds to believe that his use of the work was fair use, 24 the court may remit the
statutory damage award. 25
In addition to assuring adequate compensation for the copyright holder, the
statute’s intent is to punish and deter. 26 The damages section of the Copyright
Act was amended in 1999 to increase the amount of statutory damages in
response to digital theft by users of the Internet. 27 When the defendant requests a
jury trial, the jury decides what the defendant will pay within the wide range of
damages. 28 To determine the amount of statutory damages the trier of fact
considers the harm to the plaintiffs and deterrence of the defendant. 29
The election of statutory damages can be made at any time before final
judgment is rendered. 30 The choice to recover statutory damages precludes a
recovery of both the plaintiff’s actual damages and the defendant’s profits.31
Many plaintiffs choose statutory damages over actual damages because it is
difficult to quantify their actual damages, or the defendant’s profits. 32 There are
many factors in the computation of actual damages such as injury to the market
value of the copyrighted work, imputed license fees and interest. 33 Each of these
23

Id.
Id. § 107. Fair use of a copyrighted work is an affirmative defense where violation of one
of the exclusive rights is allowed when the work is used for “purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research [and] is not an infringement of copyright.”
Id.
25
Id. § 504(c)(2).
26
STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 103 (Comm. Print 1961),
reprinted in 3 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (George S. Grossman Ed.,
1976).
27
Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No.
106-160, 113 Stat. 1774, (1999) (amending chapter 5 of title 17 of the United States Code to
increase statutory damages for copyright infringement). The remedy for statutory damages dates
back to the 1710 Statute of Anne in England. Copyright Act, 1709, 8 Ann. c. 19 (Eng.). In 1790,
the United States promulgated the Copyright Act which included a statutory damages provision.
Copyright Act of 1790 § 1. Although the Copyright Act has been amended several times, each
time the statutory damages provision has been preserved. See YEN & LIU, supra note 3, at 12.
28
Cass County Music Co. v. C.H.L.R., Inc., 88 F.3d 635, 643-44 (8th Cir. 1996) (“The law
commits to the trier of facts, within the named limits, discretion to apply the measure furnished by
the statute.”).
29
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 14.04[B] (2009).
30
Id. § 14.02.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
24
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requires the assessment of lost revenue, indirect damage, business trends and
punitive damages. 34 The courts do their best to make a fair appraisal of the
work’s damages, but many plaintiffs find it easier to opt for the statutory award. 35
B. Constitutional Protection Under the Due Process Clause
Copyright protection stems from the Constitution. Article one, Section eight,
Clause eight was drafted “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right of their
respective Writings . . . .” 36 The Constitution protects a person’s liberty under the
Due Process Clause. 37
1. Due Process Protection: Punitive Damages
When damages are awarded based on the defendant’s conduct, and not on the
plaintiff’s actual harm, the intent is to punish and deter blameworthy conduct. 38
These are punitive damages. 39 When punitive damages are found to be grossly
excessive compared to compensatory, or actual damages, they can be considered
offensive to our sense of justice and therefore, unconstitutional. 40 If a punitive
damages award is so far above the actual damages, or harm suffered, and the court
determines it is grossly excessive it is a violation of the Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution. 41
a. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore
Gore addressed excessive punitive damages and suggested a maximum
constitutional limit. 42 The Supreme Court found the punitive damages award,
which was five hundred times the compensatory damages, to be “grossly
excessive,” and the Court promulgated a three-part test to determine the result. 43
The test consisted of the following factors: (1) the reprehensibility of the
defendant’s conduct; (2) the disparity between the harm actually suffered and the
34

Id.
Id.
36
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
37
“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
38
Punitive damages are defined as “[awards] in addition to actual damages when the
defendant acted with recklessness, malice, or deceit” and specifically, “damages assessed by way
of penalizing the wrongdoer or making an example to others.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 418
(8th ed. 2004).
39
Id.
40
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996).
41
Id. at 568.
42
Id. at 559–61.
43
Id. at 560.
35
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punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the remedy in the
specific case and the remedies imposed in comparable cases. 44
b. Philip Morris USA v. Williams
Philip Morris USA v. Williams 45 is another example of the Supreme Court’s
constraint on punitive damages. 46 This case involved a negligence and deceit
lawsuit brought by Williams’ estate against Phillip Morris, a cigarette
manufacturer. 47 The jury found an award of compensatory damages in the
amount of $821,000 and $79.5 million in punitive damages. 48 The issue before
the Supreme Court was whether the Constitution’s Due Process Clause permits a
jury to base a punitive damages award in part to punish the defendant for harm to
those who are not presently victims before the court. 49 The Court held that these
awards would be a “taking of ‘property’ from the defendant without due
process.” 50
c. Punitive Damages Have Propensity for Unconstitutionality
The rule on punitive damages seems settled. In light of Gore and Williams,
guidelines have been developed for punitive damages. 51 Synthesizing the rules
from these cases leads to the conclusion that these damages should be constrained
for the sake of fairness and justice.52 Gore and Williams discuss the relationship
of actual damages to punitive damages at length. However, neither of them
specifically addressed statutory damages.

44

Id. at 574–75.
549 U.S. 346 (2007).
46
Id. at 346–47.
47
Id. at 349. The plaintiff, Jesse Williams was a heavy cigarette smoker, and smoked a brand
of cigarette that Phillip Morris manufactured. Id. Because Williams’ death was caused by
smoking, the jury found that both Williams and Phillip Morris were negligent and deceitful
because Phillip Morris led Williams to believe that smoking was safe. Id. at 350.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 349.
50
Id.
51
See BMW of N. Am. Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 560 (1996) (noting that the award was
grossly excessive based on three guidelines); Williams, 549 U.S. at 353 (stating that there are
procedures for evaluating punitive damages and amounts deemed as grossly excessive).
52
See Gore, 517 U.S. at 574 (stating that notions of fairness in “constitutional jurisprudence
dictate that a person receive fair notice” of a certain conduct’s punishment and the “severity of the
penalty that the State may impose”); Williams, 549 U.S. at 353 (stating that the Due Process
Clause forbids the use of punitive damages to punish a defendant for injuries caused to strangers
to the suit).
45
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2. Due Process Protection & the Copyright Statutory Damages Regime
Copyright statutory damages are similar to punitive damages in that the
copyright statutory damages regime is based on deterrence of the defendant’s
conduct, not on the plaintiff’s harm. 53 Whether statutory damages can be
considered excessive and violate the Due Process Clause, comparable to
excessive punitive damages, is up for debate. 54
a. Zomba Enterprises, Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc.
In Zomba Enterprises, Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 55 the court tried to
apply the tests of Gore and Williams to statutory damages in a copyright
infringement case. 56 The defendant, Panorama Records, argued that the statutory
damages award, which was thirty-seven times more than the actual damages,
violated the Due Process Clause. 57 Although the court knew of no case where the
Gore test was applied to statutory damages, and refused to apply the Gore factors
directly, it suggested in dicta that these precedents may apply to statutory
damages. 58
b. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc.
A separate set of factors has been promulgated to strictly address statutory
damages. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 59 discussed the enormous
range of statutory damages that can be awarded for any one work, and

53

See Zomba Enters., Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc. 491 F.3d 574, 587 (6th Cir. 2007)
(stating that some courts through dicta have suggested that the precedents set in Gore regarding
punitive damages may apply to statutory-damage awards); see also, STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION
OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 103 (Comm. Print 1961).
54
Zomba, 491 F.3d at 587 (stating that the Supreme Court of the United States has not
indicated whether Gore applies to awards of statutory damages).
55
491 F.3d 574 (6th Cir. 2007).
56
Id. at 586–88.
57
Id. at 586.
58
Id. at 587. The case involved a music publishing company, Zomba Enterprises, suing
Panorama Records, a company that manufactures and sells karaoke compact discs, for
infringement. Id. at 578–79. The plaintiffs proved that their copyrights had been infringed and
elected statutory damages. Id. at 578. In response to the defendant’s argument that the awarded
statutory damages in a ratio of 37:1 was excessive and in violation of due process, the court of
appeals stated, “[w]e note at the outset that . . . Gore . . . addressed due-process challenges to
punitive-damages awards.” Id. at 586. “The Supreme Court has not indicated whether Gore . . .
appl[ies] to awards of statutory damages.” Id. at 587. It then held that the ratio of statutory
damages to actual damages was not unacceptable compared to the 113:1 ratio in Williams. Id. at
587–88.
59
109 F. Supp. 2d 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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subsequently found a way to greatly reduce them. 60 Most significantly, the court
in UMG Recordings decided that each CD, rather than each individual sound
recording, was the proper measuring point for the per infringement calculation of
damages. 61 This favored the defendant because it drastically reduced the amount
of damages that could have been awarded if considered on a per—song basis. 62
MP3.Com copied thousands of songs from several record companies’ CDs
and allowed a user of the MP3.Com online system to instantly stream the
unauthorized copy of the sound recording. 63 Although users of the system
already owned the CDs, the court found that MP3.Com had actual knowledge that
it was in violation of copyright law. 64 The court found MP3.Com willfully
infringed UMG Recordings copyrighted sound recordings. 65
The court ignored Gore, and constructed its own test to settle the amount of
statutory damages to attach to each infringed work. 66
In making its
determination, the court considered: (1) the size and scope of the defendant’s
infringement in conjunction with the potential for harm; (2) the mitigating actions
of the defendant between the complaint and the trial; (3) the size and financial
assets of the defendant; and (4) the deterrence of parties not before the court
before deciding to assess damages on a per—CD basis. 67 Weighing these factors,
the court concluded that each work allowed for $25,000 in statutory damages for a
total award of $118 million. 68
c. Reconciling Zomba & UMG
The decision in UMG Recordings to break the statutory damages down to a
per—CD, rather than a per—song calculation, is evidence that he believed a per—
song calculation would be too high. Furthermore, this award was against a forprofit company, not an individual consumer. This decision infers that the vast
range of statutory damages is far too wide.
The three-factor Gore test applied substantive due process rather than
procedural due process. 69 Under the copyright statutory damages regime, a
60

Id. at 223–25.
Id. at 224–25.
62
See id. at 224 (the court denied damages based on a per-song basis).
63
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, No. 00 CIV. 472(JSR), 2000 WL 1262568, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2000).
64
Id. at *2–4.
65
Id. at *4.
66
Id. at *5–6.
67
Id.
68
Id. at *6.
69
See supra text accompanying notes 36–51.
61
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defendant receives notice of the amount of an award of statutory damages because
of the limits outlined within the statute itself. 70 This satisfies the procedural due
process notice requirement. 71 It has been argued; however, that the three-factor
Gore test should go on to analyze substantive due process, beyond the mere notice
requirement to determine whether the award is grossly excessive. 72
A second argument is that even though statutory damages are fixed by the
legislature and known to the defendant, the legislature’s discretion in setting those
awards must have a limit. 73 The legislature’s discretion should be checked by the
judiciary within the context of an individual case. Cooper Industries, Inc. v.
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., a case involving punitive damages in an action for
false advertising, stated that legislatures have broad discretion “in authorizing and
limiting permissible punitive damages awards.” 74 It further held that when juries
make awards based within those legislative limits, it is the court’s role to analyze
the constitutionality of the award under the de novo standard. 75
Finally, on the issue of what is just and fair, Feltner v. Columbia Pictures
states that the statutes’ limits are what the court “considers just.” 76 However, the
jury must determine what that award will be. 77 A jury has properly exercised its
discretion as long as it has operated to award the damages within the statutory
limits. 78
As one can assess by the recent case law analyzed above, the punitive effect
of statutory damages when applied to multiple works at one time can grow to an
enormously excessive and costly lesson of deterrence. 79 Currently, copyright
statutory damages can create a wide and unpredictable range in amount.
Although there is a strong case that this would violate the Due Process Clause
of the Constitution, the courts have not indicated they are willing to move on such
70

17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006).
“Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a
person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also the
severity of the penalty that the State may impose.” BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574
(1996).
72
John Zenneth Lagrow, BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore: Due Process Protection
Against Excessive Punitive Damages Awards, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 157, 194 (1997) (discussion
of tort reformists failed efforts in Congress to cap punitive damages awards and the Supreme
Court’s answer that the Due Process Clause should constrain punitive damages).
73
Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 425 (2001).
74
Id. at 433.
75
Id. at 436.
76
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 345 (1998).
77
Id. at 354.
78
Id.
79
See supra Part II.B.2.
71
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a holding. The broad range in the amount of damages is not itself a problem
under the current law. Therefore copyright remedies are likely to remain where
they are until Congress addresses the situation.
III. WRITING—EVOLUTION OF THE STRUGGLE FOR PROTECTION
Since the early 1990s and the introduction of online media distribution
systems, copyright holders have faced an exponentially expanding problem of
digital piracy over the Internet. These media systems have made it easy to
download and disseminate billions of digital copies of copyrighted sound
recordings illegally. This theft has resulted in copyright holders, artists,
songwriters, musicians and record label employees among others to sustain
financial losses. 80
The Recording Industry Association of America’s (“RIAA”) first strategy was
to battle the peer-to-peer file sharing companies and Internet service providers for
secondary infringement. 81 Next, the industry launched an advertising campaign
hoping that it was just ill-education of the online users that was to blame. 82
Finally, when those did not yield the desired results, they introduced the latest
highly controversial strategy and began suing the non-commercial individual
users themselves. 83
A. Contributory Infringement, Vicarious Liability & the Peer-to-Peer File
Sharing Companies
The RIAA apparently believed that a litigation campaign was the only
solution to the music industry’s infringement problem. This new infringement
problem was a result of new technology; a combination of the Internet and digital
music files. The RIAA sought to repair its injury by first suing the peer-to-peer
file sharing companies, as it was difficult to identify direct individual infringers.
This campaign did not involve claims for direct infringement, but instead
claimed contributory infringement and vicarious liability.
Contributory
80

An analysis completed by the Institute for Policy Innovation concluded that music
piracy globally has caused $12.5 billion of economic losses every year, 71,060 U.S. jobs lost,
a loss of $2.7 billion in workers’ earnings, and a loss of $422 million in tax revenues, $291
million in personal income tax and $131 million in lost corporate income and production taxes.
STEVEN E. SIWEK, INSTITUTE FOR POLICY INNOVATION, THE TRUE COST OF SOUND RECORDING
PIRACY TO THE U.S. ECONOMY 1 (2007), http://www.ipi.org/IPI/ IPIPublications.nsf/Publication
LookupFullTextPDF/51CC65A1D4779E408625733E00529174/$File/SoundRecordingPiracy.pdf?
OpenElement.
81
Podcast: Intellectual Property Colloquium, Statutory Damages and the Tenenbaum
Litigation (2009), http://www.ipcolloquium.com/Programs/5.html.
82
Id.
83
Id.
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infringement is found when the defendant has knowledge of the directly
infringing activity and substantially participates in inducing the infringing
activity. 84 Vicarious liability is found if the defendant had the right and ability to
control the actions of the infringer, and received direct financial benefit from the
infringement. 85
1. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.
In A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 86 the record companies sued Napster,
an online peer-to-peer network for contributory infringement and vicarious
liability of the individual users of its system. 87 The individual users were the
direct infringers of the copyrighted works. The court found the act of
downloading copyrighted sound recordings on a peer-to-peer network, without a
license from the copyright owners, violated the copyright owners’ exclusive
reproduction right. 88 It was held that the act of distributing, or making available,
for electronic distribution on a peer-to-peer network, without license from the
copyright owners, violated the copyright owners’ exclusive right of distribution,
regardless of whether actual distribution has been shown. 89 Before Napster had
the duty to disable access to the offending content, the plaintiff record companies
had to provide notice to Napster of the copyrighted works, and the files containing
such works, on Napster’s system. 90
The court held that A & M was likely to succeed on the merits for
contributory infringement because Napster facilitated the direct infringement of
its users. 91 Napster was also found guilty of vicarious liability because it had the
ability to control its users’ behavior. 92 It turned a blind eye to evidence of the
infringing actions because of the possible gain of future profits. 93 Napster’s
84

Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm’ns Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1373–
76 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
85
Id. at 1375–78.
86
239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
87
Id. at 1011.
88
Id. at 1013–14.
89
Id. This holding was distinguished in Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d
1210, 1217 (D. Minn. 2008). See infra Part IV.A.3. In the motion and order for a new trial, the
court found that when no actual distribution is shown, it does not constitute copyright
infringement. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. at 1210. The jury instruction stating this rule from Napster
was found erroneous. Id. Thomas can be distinguished from Napster by the disputed fact that the
user actually distributed sound recordings, rather than only post the recordings to a shared folder.
Id. at 1212. Further, the central issue of Napster was secondary liability for the creators of the
Napster file-sharing system and not primary liability as in Thomas. Id.
90
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1027.
91
Id. at 1020.
92
Id. at 1023.
93
Id.
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success was directly related to the number of its users, and it did not want to
alienate potential sources of revenue.
2. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.
Plaintiff copyright holders brought actions for contributory infringement and
vicarious liability against the distributors of a peer-to-peer file sharing network in
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 94 Grokster advertised that
it could do what the Napster system had done and enticed former Napster users to
download the Grokster software. 95 This sealed Grokster’s fate as it was found
liable for both contributory infringement and vicarious liability under the
reasoning that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to
infringe, shown by clear expression, or other affirmative steps taken to foster
infringement, is liable for the resulting infringing acts of third parties. 96 The court
also held that the act of downloading copyrighted sound recordings on a peer-topeer network, without a license from the copyright owners, violated the owners’
exclusive reproduction and distribution rights. 97
3. Digital Rights Management: Fighting Technology with Technology
The Internet has made it is easy for one to copy and circulate copyrighted
material quickly and inexpensively. Conversely, it is difficult and expensive for
the copyright holder to identify individual infringers, and follow through with
litigation. Because of these difficulties, many rights holders have turned to digital
rights management (“DRM”) to protect their works.
To counter theft of intangible intellectual property, an analogy has been made
to tangible property. DRM is likened to a security system for tangible goods. 98
By employing technological protections rather than, or in addition to, legal
protections, deterrence by high statutory damages could become obsolete. These
‘lock-out’ systems, which physically hinder access to intangible goods on terms
employed by the copyright holder may be a better answer than litigation based on
a click-through licensing agreement a consumer may never read. 99

94

545 U.S. 913, 929–30 (2005).
Id. at 938.
96
Id. at 930.
97
Id.; see also Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1210 (D. Minn. 2008)
(finding that the act of making the copyrighted work available on the Internet violated the
exclusive right of distribution).
98
Dan L. Burk, Legal and Technical Standards in Digital Rights Management Technology, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 537, 538 (2005).
99
Id. at 546.
95
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B. The Education of Society
In addition to the litigation campaign against peer-to-peer file sharing
networks, the RIAA tried an advertising campaign to educate the general public
on unlawful music downloading. 100 For example, there are warning notices on
commercially sold CDs and DVDs. There have been news reports, articles, and
other media informing the public that the use of an online media distribution
system to download copyrighted digital media, and distribute it to others
constitutes copyright infringement. 101
IV. SELECTION OF PERFORMERS—LIABILITY OF THE
NON-COMMERCIAL USER
The battle against illegal downloading was not won on the front against the
ISPs, or the nationwide advertising campaign. A poll taken at the time of these
efforts showed that that only thirty percent of the population thought that these
downloads were illegal. 102 After the RIAA targeted non-commercial users, a
subsequent poll showed that seventy percent of the population thought that
downloading music in violation of copyright laws was illegal. 103 Despite the rise
in awareness, individual consumers were still downloading and distributing
billions of copyrighted sound recordings unlawfully.
Thus, the rights holders turned their attention to the direct infringers: the noncommercial users. 104 The battle against the non-commercial user has been the
100

For an example of an anti-piracy advertisement see Posting of NewLine to YouTube,
TENACIOUS D—Jack Black on Piracy, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-LkWKvMCzqA&
feature=related (Oct. 1, 2006). For an example of the public discrediting the anti-piracy
advertisement campaign see Posting of awkward pictures to YouTube, Online Piracy PSA Parody,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oXR4T8xVFdw&feature=PlayList&p=128BEF08A149D14B
&playnext=1&playnext_from=PL&index=34 (July 20, 2006).
101
Initial Disclosure Statement for Plaintiff, Capital Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d
1210 (D. Minn. 2008) (No. 06-cv-1497), 2007 WL 5269114, at § B5.
102
Intellectual Property Colloquium, supra at note 81.
103
Id.
104
As the Internet improves, both in speed, and graphics, other industries are facing similar
problems with digital piracy. The film industry is currently implementing creative solutions for its
illegal downloading problem. It has found that increasing amounts of its perpetrators are industry
insiders. A.J. Bedel, Lights, Camera, Lawsuit, 2003 DUKE L.& TECH. REV. 31, ¶ 10 (available at
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2003dltr0031.html). The film industry’s litigation
campaign against industry insiders, rather than individual consumers, is easier. Id. ¶ 11. Not only
because the application of the elements of trade secret law to insiders is simpler, but also because
the pool of defendants is smaller. Id. ¶¶ 12–13. For trade secret law to apply, these industry
employees must have knowledge that their actions are not allowed by their employer. See
generally id. The average consumer of music is not aware of the copyright laws that govern the
music downloading, and even when prompted, rarely read the click-through terms of service. Id.
¶¶ 13–14.
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target of much criticism. 105 The general population identifies with the noncommercial consumer defendant in a suit for infringement against a large record
company.
There is concern that the recording industry and copyright holders will
transform these proceedings “into a forum where they can preach the evils of
peer-to-peer network infringing on a national scale.” 106 The record companies
argue that they must raise the existence of disputes against the consumer to
demonstrate the harm of downloading and sharing copyrighted sound recordings,
and that this harm must be established to determine the amount of statutory
damages they are entitled to receive. 107 This approach may tarnish the reputation
of the record companies, and may have the adverse effect of increasing illegal
downloads as a method of protest against the record companies. 108
A. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas
The first case to be tried to a jury on the issue of liability of a direct infringer
and non-commercial user was Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas. 109 Jammie
Thomas-Rasset, a Minnesota single mother, was charged and originally found
liable for direct copyright infringement of 24 songs.110
1. Facts of the Case
Thomas-Rasset had an account with the online music system, KaZaA. 111
KaZaA is an Internet service that allows its users to download unlimited music

105

Mike Madison, A New Low, MADISONIAN.NET, June 18, 2009, http://madisonian.net/2009/
06/18/a-new-low/#more-2541.
106
Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Her Three Docket 67 Motions in Limine at 3,
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008) (No. 06-cv-1497), 2007
WL 5268238.
107
Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Three Docket 67 Motions in Limine at 5–6, Thomas,
579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (No. 06-cv-1497), 2007 WL 2859948.
108
See Richard Menta, Record Industry Win in Capitol Records v. Thomas a Public Relations
Problem, MP3NEWSWIRE.NET, June 20, 2009, http://www.mp3newswire.net/stories/9002/badpr.html.
109
579 F. Supp. 2d at 1212–13.
110
Mike Harvey, Single-mother digital pirate Jammie Thomas-Rasset must pay $80,000 per
song, TIMES ONLINE, June 19, 2009, http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech_and_web/
article6534542.ece.
111
Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1212–13. KaZaA is a “subscription-based service” connected
with Brilliant Digital Entertainment (“BDE”). KaZaA, About KaZaA, http://www.KaZaA.com/
about/ about.aspx (last visited Mar. 16, 2010). BDE is a “distributor of licensed digital content”
which includes copyrighted music selections. Id. For a monthly subscription fee of fewer than
twenty dollars, BDE claims one can download unlimited music files and play all of those files on
up to three personal computers as well as unlimited ring tones to play on a single cell phone. Id.
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files for a single monthly fee. 112 KaZaA was also a semi-decentralized peer-topeer network which allowed its subscribers to create sharing folders used to share
music files with other users. 113 When KaZaA was installed on a user’s computer,
it created the shared folder to store downloaded music files and to allow access to
those files by other users. 114 Users that retrieved the music files from others’
shared folders did not pay KaZaA or the copyright holders of the digital
recordings. 115
On February 21, 2005, the record companies’ investigator, SafeNet, Inc.,
detected individuals engaged in the infringement of its copyrighted sound
recordings by downloading audio files for free over the Internet and placing these
files in a shared folder on the KaZaA network. 116 SafeNet, Inc. discovered that

112

KaZaA, About KaZaA, http://www.KaZaA.com/about/about.aspx (last visited Mar. 16,

2010).
113

Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Three Docket 67 Motions in Limine, supra note 107,

at 5.
114

Id. A semi-decentralized peer-to-peer network uses a central index server that contains a
list of the music files that are available for distribution by the network users. Id. Additional
sharing folders can also be set up and used to distribute files among other users. Id. Distributing
files requires affirmative action by the user. First, the user must place the file into the folder to be
distributed. Id. When a user wants to locate a file in another users shared folder to download, he
submits a query to the central index and is directed to where the file is located. Id.
115
It is unknown to this author what the KaZaA Terms and Conditions of Use were at the
time the complaint was filed against Thomas-Rasset. This was a jury trial and no opinion on the
merits has been issued. However, the relevant portions of the Terms and Conditions of Use
currently state:
You may use the Materials for personal, noncommercial entertainment use only;
you are not granted any commercial, sale, resale, reproduction, distribution or
promotional use rights for the Materials . . . You may not make any use of the
Materials that would infringe the copyright therein. You must comply with all
applicable law in your use of Materials and agree to protect any third party
licensor’s rights therein. You may not make any unauthorized reproduction or
distribution of Materials that violates applicable law.
KaZaA, About KazaA, http://www.KaZaA.com/about/about.aspx (last visited Mar. 16, 2010)
(emphasis added).
116
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Adjudication of Specific Facts at
2, Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008) (No. 06-cv-1497),
2007 WL 4586693. Through discovery, the plaintiff found that Thomas had knowledge of
Napster and knew that copying and sharing copyrighted music files over the Internet was illegal.
United States of America’s Memorandum in Defense of the Constitutionality of the Statutory
Damages Provision of the Copyright Act, 17. U.S.C. § 504(c) at 14, Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d
1210 (No. 06-cv-1497), 2007 WL 5268235 [hereinafter United States’ Memorandum in Defense].

[1:174 2010]

Note: The Statutory Damages Regime of
Copyright Law: The Non-Commercial User and
Capital Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset

191

Thomas-Rasset downloaded, and made available for distribution, multiple
copyrighted digital works through her shared folder. 117
Charter Communications, in response to a subpoena, identified ThomasRasset as the subscriber responsible for the infringing Internet protocol address. 118
SafeNet found 1,702 digital audio files in Thomas-Rasset’s shared folder. 119 A
sample of twenty-four of these works was chosen by the plaintiffs to assert their
rights. 120 Thomas-Rasset had created a shared file folder, and downloaded music
files to the shared folder that allowed other users to access the files. 121
The record companies filed a lawsuit against Thomas-Rasset for willful
reproduction and distribution of the music recordings to constitute a claim for
copyright infringement. 122 They contended that Thomas-Rasset, without consent,
used the online media system KaZaA to download, and then distribute the
copyrighted recordings to the public. 123 The plaintiffs prayed for statutory
damages, instead of actual damages and profits, for each of the twenty-four
copyrighted recordings pursuant to Section 504 of the Copyright Act. 124 They
also asked for injunctive relief. 125
2. Jury Verdict: Trial 1
The jury was instructed on the elements of the plaintiff’s claim for copyright
infringement: (1) whether the plaintiff’s were owners of the copyrighted works,
and (2) whether the defendant infringed one or more of the works. 126 The jury
was also instructed on the meaning of “willful” in the context of copyright

117

Complaint for Copyright Infringement at 4, Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (No. 06-cv1497), 2006 WL 1431921.
118
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Adjudication of Specific Facts,
supra note 116, at 2. Thomas-Rasset was chosen from 20,000 other individuals that were flagged
by SafeNet. Kristen Nicole, RIAA’s Sacrificial Lamb Brought to Trial, MASHABLE: THE SOCIAL
MEDIA GUIDE, Oct. 2, 2007, http://mashable.com/2007/10/02/riaa-capitol-records-v-jammiethomas/ (explaining Thomas was contacted via instant messenger before she received an official
letter sent through her ISP, Charter Communications).
119
Nicole, supra note 118.
120
Id.
121
Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s Three Docket 67 Motions in Limine, supra note 107,
at 6.
122
Complaint for Copyright Infringement, supra note 117, at 4–5.
123
Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instructions at 3, Capitol Records, Inc v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp.
2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008) (No. 06-cv-1497), 2009 WL 1683922.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Stipulated Jury Instructions at 19, Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (No. 06-cv-1497), 2007
WL 2859934.
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infringement. 127 If infringement was found, the jury had to decide the amount of
statutory damages based on whether they determined infringement was willful or
non-willful. 128
The jury found that the plaintiffs owned the works. 129 The jury also found
that the defendant willfully infringed the twenty-four song recordings. 130 This
amounted to statutory damages for each song of $9,250, for a total damage award
of $222,000. 131
3. New Trial
Thomas-Rasset promptly filed a motion for a new trial.132 Based primarily on
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore 133 and State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 134 she argued that the statutory damages award was
excessive, and in violation of the Due Process Clause of the United States

127

Id. at 20 (“‘Willful’ means that a defendant had knowledge that his or actions constituted
copyright infringement.”). If it is found that the defendant infringed a copyright willfully, the
range of statutory damages is escalated to a maximum of $150,000 per infringed work. General
Revision of Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat 2541 (1976). For a decision of
infringement, the jury had to find that either Thomas-Rasset downloaded the recordings or made
the recordings available for electronic distribution using a peer-to-peer network without a license
from the copyright owner (violating the exclusive right of reproduction and the exclusive right of
distribution). Stipulated Jury Instructions, supra note 126, at 19.
128
Special Verdict Form at 2–8, Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (No. 06-cv-1497), 2007 WL
2957532.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Defendant’s Motion for New Trial, Or In the Alternative, for Remittitur at 1, Thomas, 579
F. Supp. 2d 1210 (No. 06-cv-1497), 2007 WL 4586690.
133
517 U.S. 559 (1996).
134
491 F.3d 574 (6th Cir. 2007).
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Constitution. 135 Her ultimate argument was that the legislatively-fixed sanction
under the copyright statutory damages regime was unconstitutional. 136
Thomas-Rasset argued that the damages award was greater than 1,000 times
the actual damages that were suffered by the plaintiffs. 137 She likened the
copyright statutory damages regime to the punitive damages regime because of its
similar intent to deter. 138 Although the stream of cases Thomas-Rasset cited
discussed the issue of punitive damages, and not statutory damages, she called on
the court to use its discretion to lower the damages because they were grossly
excessive. 139
In response, the plaintiff record companies argued that Thomas-Rasset
inappropriately applied the test for excessive punitive damages to an award for
statutory damages. 140 The plaintiffs stated that this test was improper because this
case was within the carefully circumscribed category to which copyright statutory
135

Defendant’s Motion for New Trial, Or In the Alternative, for Remittitur, supra note 132, at
1–2. Interestingly, after her motion was filed, the United States moved to intervene and defend
the constitutionality of 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). United States’ Memorandum in Defense, supra note
116, at 1. It stated that Thomas applied the wrong standard when scrutinizing statutory damages.
Id. at 7. Instead of applying Gore, Thomas-Rasset had to apply the standard set forth in St. Louis,
I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams which is a less demanding standard applicable to punitive damages
and more deferential. Id. at 7–8; St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 67 (1919).
For a statutory damages award to fail the test in St. Louis, it must be “so severe and oppressive as
to be wholly disproportioned to the offense or obviously unreasonable.” 251 U.S. at 67. The year
the case was decided, 1919, raises the question of whether this precedent aligns with the purpose
of the new amendments to the Copyright Act, made in 1999.
136
Defendant’s Motion for New Trial, or in the Alternative, for Remittitur, supra note 132, at
9–12.
137
Id. at 1 n.1 (“[A]ttesting that popular music sound recording downloads and consumer
license[s] to use the same are lawfully obtainable to the public at 99 cents per song, and of the 99
cents, roughly 70 cents per song is paid by the retailer to the record label.”).
138
Id. at 6. According to the House Report, the 1999 amendments made to Section 504(c) of
the Copyright Act, which increased the ranges of damages, stated “juries must be able to render
awards that deter others from infringing intellectual property rights.” H.R. Rep. No. 106-216
(1999). Also, in The United States’ Memorandum in Defense, the government stated that a
remedy is not to be construed as a form of punitive damages just because it is meant to deter, and
that that “defendant mistakenly conflate[d] the deterrence element that exists in the statutory
damages context with punitive damages.” United States’ Memorandum in Defense, supra note
116, at 10.
139
Defendant’s Motion for New Trial, or in the Alternative, for Remittitur, supra note 132, at
12. The main cases that were cited by Thomas-Rasset included BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559 (1996), State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), and Zomba Enters.
v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574 (6th Cir. 2007).
140
Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for New Trial, or in the
Alternative for Remittitur at 2, Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D.Minn.
2008) (No. 06-cv-1497), 2007 WL 4586692.
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damages apply. 141 Further, they stated that Thomas-Rasset was notified about the
damages range, and did not object to that range prior to the verdict. 142 ThomasRasset’s attempt to reduce the award was contrary to Congress’ carefully crafted
regime of statutory damages, 143 which may be awarded even in the absence of
proof of actual damages. 144
In defense of the high statutory damages award, the record companies pointed
to the fact that Thomas-Rasset made the infringed recordings available to
potentially millions of other KaZaA users. 145 Although there was no evidence as
to how many users downloaded the songs from Thomas-Rasset’s shared folder,
the record companies stated that they had suffered substantial harm by the general
distribution of their copyrighted recordings over the Internet. 146 The plaintiffs
minimized the award of $222,000 by comparing it to the amount the jury was
authorized to award. 147 It was concluded that $222,000 was only ten percent of
what the award could have been. 148 The plaintiffs then emphasized the legislative
history of Section 504 of the Copyright Act and its intent to deter. 149
141

Id.
Id. at 1–2. This was also the argument in the United State’s memorandum on the issue of
notice. United States’ Memorandum in Defense, supra note 116 at 10–11.
143
The Congressional Record outlines the intent of the statutory damages regime.
Congressman Coble from North Carolina stated during debates that the amendment “makes
significant improvements in the ability of the Copyright Act to deter copyright infringement by
amending it to increase the statutory penalties for infringement.” 145 CONG. REC. H12884-01
(daily ed. Nov. 18, 1999) (statement of Cong. Coble). “Copyright piracy . . . is flourishing in the
world. With the advanced technologies available and the fact that many computer users are either
ignorant of the copyright laws or simply believe that they will not be caught or punished, the
piracy trend will continue.” Id.
144
United States’ Memorandum in Defense, supra note 116, at 16. When actual damages are
difficult to ascertain, statutory damages compensate those wronged by ensuring that those who
have wronged them are deterred. Id.
145
Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for New Trial or in the
Alternative, for Remittitur, supra note 140, at 2.
146
Id. The United States argued that because of the incalculable harms due to the potential
millions of users over the Internet who had infringed copyrighted music, the high and broad range
of statutory damages was justified. United States’ Memorandum in Defense, supra note 116, at
16.
147
Because the jury found that Thomas-Rasset committed infringement willfully, the
maximum the jury could have found for each infringing work is $150,000. 17. U.S.C. § 504(c)(2)
(2006). The jury could have found statutory damages in the amount of $3,600,000.
148
Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for New Trial or in the
Alternative, for Remittitur, supra note 140, at 3.
149
Id. at 9–10; see also KaZaA, supra note 112. To elaborate on the legislative and executive
intent behind the “Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damage Improvement Act of 1999”
which amended Section 504 of the Copyright Act, upon signing the bill, President Clinton stated
“[t]hat this legislation will increase for the first time since 1988 the statutory damages that a
142
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Abiding by constitutional avoidance, the District Court of Minnesota asked
the parties to brief the “making available” issue. 150 Jury Instruction No. 15 stated
that “[t]he act of making copyrighted sound recordings available for electronic
distribution on a peer-to-peer network, without license from the copyright owners,
violates the copyright owners’ exclusive right of distribution, regardless of
whether actual distribution has been shown.” 151 Thomas-Rasset argued that the
court committed an error of law when it instructed the jury that the act of making
copyrighted sound recordings available for electronic distribution on a peer-topeer network, without permission from the rights holder, violates the owner’s
exclusive right of distribution, even if no actual distribution had been shown. 152
The judge decided that Jury Instruction No. 15 was erroneous and issued a
new trial. 153 In the memorandum and order for a new trial the judge expressed:
The court would be remiss if it did not take this opportunity to
amend the Copyright Act to address liability and damages in peerto-peer network cases such as the one currently before this Court . .
. the total damages awarded is $222,000, more than five hundred
times the cost the buying 24 separate CDs . . . 154
4. Jury Verdict: Trial 2
At the conclusion of the second trial, the jury found that (1) each plaintiff
respectfully owned the copyrights in each work; (2) Thomas-Rasset 155 committed
an act of infringement with respect to each of the works; and (3) Thomas-Rasset
infringed each work willfully. 156 As a result, the jury found Thomas-Rasset liable
copyright holder may recover for certain copyright infringements. This increase in penalties
should be an effective deterrent to would-be pirates of copyrighted works.” President’s Message
to Congress on Digital Theft Deterrence Act, 1999 WL 1128961 (White House, Dec. 9, 1999).
150
Defendant’s Second Memorandum of Law In Support of Her Motion for New Trial at 3–4,
Capital Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008) (No. 06-cv-1497), 2008
WL 4660356.
151
Id. (emphasis added).
152
Defendant’s Second Memorandum of Law In Support of Her Motion for New Trial at 5–7,
Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (No. 06-cv-1497), 2008 WL 4660356. Thomas-Rasset cited
binding Eighth Circuit precedent in the case of National Car Rental Systems, Inc. v. Computer
Associates International, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 434 (8th Cir. 1993). National Car Rental held that
“infringement of the distribution right requires an actual dissemination . . . .” Id. at 434 (quoting
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.11[A] (2009)).
153
Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1228.
154
Id. at 1227 (emphasis original).
155
Jammie Thomas had changed her name to Jammie Thomas-Rasset by the time the second
trial had commenced.
156
Special Verdict Form at 9–13, Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (No. 06-cv-1497), 2009 WL
1717117.
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for $1.9 million, at $80,000 per work. 157 Although well within the statutory
limits, this award, which is highly disproportionate to the actual damages, raises
the constitutional questions discussed above. 158
5. Remittitur
Again, Thomas-Rasset filed a Motion for a New Trial, Remittitur, and to Alter
or Amend the Judgment because of the high amount of the statutory damages
awarded. 159 She placed three arguments before the court: (1) the statutory
damages provision of the Copyright Act violates the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution, therefore plaintiffs are entitled to nothing in damages; (2) the jury
award of statutory damages was excessive and shocking, therefore plaintiffs are
entitled to the minimum statutory amount of $750 per infringement; or (3) the
amount of damages were so excessive and shocking as to warrant a new trial. 160
In turn, the record companies filed a Motion to Amend Judgment to include a
permanent injunction against Thomas-Rasset.161
The District Court of Minnesota chose Thomas-Rasset’s second argument, but
did not remit the award to the minimum statutory amount of $750 per violation. 162
It followed the “maximum recovery rule”163 and decided to reduce ThomasRasset’s damages to three times the statutory minimum. 164 She was assessed a
damage amount of $2,250 for each of the 24 songs infringed, for a total amount of
$54,000. 165 Judge Davis stated:
This award constitutes the maximum amount a jury could
reasonably award to both compensate Plaintiffs and address the
deterrence aspect of the Copyright Act. This reduced award is
significant and harsh. . . . It was the jury’s province to determine
the award of statutory damages and this Court has merely reduced
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Id. at 17–20.
See Menta, supra note 108 (discussion of Thomas-Rasset’s expert witness who testified
that actual damages were estimated at about 99 cents per infringement).
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See Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1048 (D. Minn. 2010).
160
Id. at 1050.
161
Id.
162
Id. at 1055.
163
Id. at 1054 (citing Stogsdill v. Healthmark Partners, L.L.C., 377 F.3d 827, 834 (8th Cir.
2004); see Ogilvie v. Fotomat Corp., 641 F.2d 581, 556 n. 13 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding remittitur to
“the maximum amounts that would be sustained by [plaintiff’s] proof” is the proper standard)
(footnote omitted).
164
Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 1056–57.
165
Id.
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that award to the maximum amount that is no longer monstrous
and shocking. 166
The court discussed that Congress set the statutory minimum at $750 for nonwillful infringement, and that evidence clearly showed that Thomas-Rasset
willfully infringed the works and then lied on the witness stand trying to blame
others, including her children, for her actions. 167 Again, abiding by constitutional
avoidance, the court did not reach the question of the constitutionality of the
jury’s damages award. 168
The court also granted the record companies’ motion for a permanent
injunction against Thomas-Rasset. 169 It discussed the three-part test to determine
whether a permanent injunction is warranted: (1) the threat of irreparable harm to
the plaintiff; (2) the balance of the harm to the plaintiff as compared to the harm
suffered by the defendant if the injunction was granted; and (3) the public
interest. 170 The threat of harm to the record companies was apparent, as there was
a likelihood of future infringement by Thomas-Rasset because she had not
accepted responsibility for her actions. 171 The second factor was met, as ThomasRasset could not realize harm by being enjoined from doing something that was
illegal. 172 Finally, the third factor was against Thomas-Rasset because the general
policy behind the Copyright Act is that the public interest is in favor of upholding
copyright protections and the copyright holders’ exclusivity. 173
Although Thomas-Rasset’s damages were reduced as excessive and shocking,
the issue of whether the copyright statutory damages regime is unconstitutional
when applied to a non-commercial user has yet to be addressed by the courts.
B. Current Case Law & the Constitutional Issue of Due Process
Although other individual consumer defendants have been served for online
infringement of sound recordings, Thomas-Rasset stands alone as the only one to
go to a jury. 174 Thomas-Rasset’s counsel tried to analogize the constitutional
166
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Cir. 2005).
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Another case currently similarly situated is Capitol Records, Inc. v. Alaujan, 626 F. Supp.
2d 152 (D. Mass. 2009). In this case defendants argued that statutory damages under the
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issue of due process in punitive damages cases to those of statutory damages. 175
This issue received attention in the Judge’s order for a new trial. 176 The burning
questions are whether the amount of the award is “grossly excessive” to align
with the holding in Gore, and whether the jury may award statutory damages
based on intent to deter those not before the court in accordance with Williams. 177
To consider whether Thomas-Rasset’s statutory damages in the amount of
$1.9 million are “grossly excessive” under the standard of Gore we must apply
the three-part test set forth by the Supreme Court: the reprehensibility of the
defendant’s conduct; the disparity between the harm actually suffered and the
punitive damages award; and the difference between the remedy in the specific
case and the remedies imposed in comparable cases. 178
First, there is an argument that Thomas-Rasset met the first factor to some
degree. She intentionally uploaded over 1,700 sound recordings by various
artists. 179 She admitted in her deposition that she was familiar with the decision
of A & M Records v. Napster, 180 and was therefore minimally aware of illegal
downloading. 181 There is also the issue of replacing her hard drive after she
received notice that a complaint was to be issued against her.182 Hence, there was
evidence that her conduct was far from innocent.
Second, there was disparity between the harm actually suffered and the
statutory damages. 183 There was evidence to show a ratio of actual to statutory
damages that was greater than 1 to 1,000. 184 To apply Gore by analogy, the ratio
of actual damages to punitive damages in Gore was 1 to 500. 185 As the Gore
court found that a ratio of 1 to 500 weighed heavily on this factor, the court in
Thomas-Rasset could easily have done the same.
because the court decided that in the due process challenge to statutory damages, the Copyright
Act does not represent unconstitutional delegation of prosecutorial function, and that alleged noncommercial use is not excluded from statutory damages. Id. at 154–55; see also Sony BMG
Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 672 F. Supp. 2d 217 (D. Mass. 2009) (summary judgment for
plaintiff in fair use doctrine in file sharing case).
175
Motion for a New Trial, Remittitur, and to Alter or Amend the Judgment at 4–8, ThomasRasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (No. 06-cv-1497), 2009 WL 4922073.
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See supra Part IV.A.3.
177
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 559–60 (1996).
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Id. at 574.
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Id. at 1023–24.
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Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 912, 930 (2005).
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Gore considered punitive damages, therefore, the true inquiry is the disparity the actual
harm and the amount of punitive damages. 517 U.S. at 559.
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Third, is whether the award in the Thomas-Rasset case is similar to awards in
other cases similarly situated. 186 Currently, Thomas-Rasset is the only case that
has actually gone to a trial by jury. Many of the cases in the litigation campaign
by the record companies against non-commercial users have settled out of court.
The negotiations and settlements in these discussions are of course undisclosed,
but it is fair to infer that these defendants are not settling in the millions.
Accordingly, it is difficult to assess Thomas-Rasset’s damage award compared to
related cases.
If we compare Thomas to those cases dealing with punitive damages
previously discussed, as her counsel did, it can be argued that these cases are both
similar and dissimilar. They are analogous in that each involved damages which
seemed unconscionably high compared to the actual damages. But one point that
opposing counsel, the government, and the courts make is that punitive damages
are not statutory damages. 187 The plaintiffs argued that due process is met
because there is notice for statutory damages in the amount proscribed by
Congress. 188 Further, the intent to deter through extremely liberal ranges is
justified, and clearly within the legislature’s goal based on the history of the 1999
amendments to the Copyright Act. 189
Assuming arguendo that we can apply the elements of Gore to statutory
damages, it is not absolutely clear that Thomas would pass. According to the
evidence presented, Thomas-Rasset had knowledge of the Napster holding and
replaced the incriminating hard drive pending litigation. 190 This would meet the
first Gore factor of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct. 191
On the other hand, if there was a defendant in a situation akin to ThomasRasset’s without such incriminating evidence, a decision could be closer to the
actual holding in Gore and go the other way when applying the these factors. 192
Even if a defendant is found guilty of willful infringement, a jury can always find
a lesser amount of statutory damages. The first Thomas trial returned a verdict
much lower than the second, yet it still seems too high for an individual noncommercial entity. 193
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As we have seen, this issue is not as clear as some advocates and recent
articles suggest. At first glance the interests of the multi-million dollar
entertainment industry, pitted against the individual consumer are unbalanced,
unfair and uneven in bargaining power.
But when children are more
knowledgeable about the Internet and illegal downloading than their parents,
maybe it is only a matter of a generation. Lack of knowledge is not a defense to
illegal downloading. 194 Certainly after the Thomas case, this issue will be more
widely discussed.
V. MASTERING—CONCLUSION
The Copyright Act’s statutory damages regime is constitutional and has been
in place since the dawn of the Constitution itself. The United States, in defense of
the statutory regime, has argued that the high damage awards that were increased
in 1999 are exactly what Congress intended to deter non-commercial users. 195
Individuals are infringing and do not take the copyright laws as seriously as they
should. 196
The current strategy, however, of the record companies to combat the
infringement of sound recordings online, allows the jury awards to be
astronomical and unreasonable. Nevertheless, even if the statutory damages
awards are astronomical, the copyright holders are entitled to them; they are
allowed under the current statutory regime. Therefore, changes should be made to
the copyright statutory damages provision. The provision cannot disappear;
statutory damages are well placed to deter and recoup actual damages when those
damages are difficult to prove. But as the law now stands, both plaintiffs and
defendants are suffering. The high range of damages, up to and including
$150,000 per work, a work what costs 99 cents to download to an Apple iPod,
held against a consumer whose objective is not profit, borders on ridiculous. It
ruins the non-commercial users’ finances and may force them into bankruptcy
while marring the recording industry’s reputation.
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See Maverick Recording Co. v. Harper, 598 F.3d 193, 197 (Tex. App. 2010) (a Texas
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